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CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION
BY THE BACK DOOR
THE 1983 GEORGE WYTHE LECTURE
by
SENATOR THOMAS F. EAGLETON
Monday, April 4, 1983

The high regard in which I hold my former colleague,
your current Dean, is not the only reason why I am very pleased
to be here.

As I examined the list of previous participants

in the George Wythe Lecture Series, I found them to be very
interesting and distinguished.

An impressive group of legal

scholars and judges from both the United States and abroad
have presented ideas on a wide spectrum of important legal
issues.

It is a very laudable tradition befitting the

r .e putation of the great George Wythe, one of this Law
two namesakes.

It is a tradition I

dm

SI..~hool'

s

proud to join by my

appearance before you this afternoon.
Having said why I am very pleased to be here this afternoon,
let me give you a preview of my topic and why I believe it is
worthy of our collective inquiry.
I realize that most of the lawyers and lawyers-to-be in
this room are unlikely to have their law practice or scholarly
pursuits centrally occupied by constitutional law questions .
But this remoteness from one ' s daily legal work do es not make
a lawy er remote f rom the Constitution or from the Supreme Court
which expounds it.

After all , we lawyers depend upon a leg a l

system in which the "rule of law" is guaranteed , with stability
and finality , under established constitutional processes.
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And, as United States citizens, all of us depend upon the
Constitution for the very individual freedoms which make
"life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" possible.
In that light, I think we should all be very concerned
that during the 97th Congress, which adjourned in late 1982,
th~

role of the courts as the expounders and guarantors of

the Constitution was placed under a growing and ingenious
attack.

As you may know from press reports or other sources,

over thirty bills were introduced in the last Congress to
alter the scope and role of the Supreme Court and, in some
instances, the lower federal courts.

The Senate passed one

measure to limit federal court authority over the subject of
busing to achieve integration.

After extensive debate and

several relatively close votes, the Senate voted to sidetrack
Senator Jesse Helms' proposal to strip the courts of jurisdiction
in school prayer cases.
Some see the 'much-publicized setback to Senator Helms and
other supporters of his court-stripping bill as 't he beginning
of the end for efforts to amend the Constitution through s ·tatute.
As a vocal opponent of such legislation, I would like this to.
be the case.

However, the court-stripping impulse that

t~mpted

so many members of the preceding Congress reflects both a strong
opposition to the present trend of federal court decisions and
a deep-felt (although, in my judgment, profoundly erroneous)
view about what methods are proper for altering those decisions.
I have some doubt that we have seen the last serious
congressional consideration of efforts to reverse court rulings
by tinkering with court jurisdiction and authority.

-
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Indeed, as I make this speech, sometlrreemonths into a new
Congress, five bills have already been introduced to eliminate
court jurisdiction over the matters of abortion or school praye r.

Benchmark for Evaluation of Court-Stripping Proposals:
Th e Constitutional Scheme and Tradition
of a Strong, Inde pendent Judiciary
My discussion of the proposals to change court decisions
through simple statute will proceed along two lines.

First,

I will place these proposals in the context of how our
Cbnstitution came to provide for a strong federal judiciary
and how that tradition has heen followed -- although not
without controversy -- in the almost 200 years since the
. Constitution was ratified.

Second, I will discuss how the

major court-stripping proposals are fundamentally at odds
with our constitutional scheme and tradition.

I will do so

by breaking the propos a ls into three groups based on the
different legal questions they would put off limits and the
differing legal and policy questions they raise.

The Constitution as a Reaction
to the Articles of Confederation
Frankl y , if th e court- s tripping propos a l s I am discussing
here today were not s o pote ntially poisonous to our constitutional
s c h e me , I would b e g l a d they came before the Se n a t e .

I say that

be c a u se th e n ee d to unde r s tand and articulate jus t how at odd s
th e se proposals are with our constitutional syste m a nd tr a dit i on
l e d me to s tudy th e Cons titution's hi s toric a l a n te c e d e nt s .

- 4 Specifically, I devoted significant attention to a period that
is the least evaluated and most ignored period of our nation's
history:

the Articles of Confederation period from 1781 to 1789.

My s tudy convince d me that this time frame is perh a ps the most
important period of our nation's history for understanding the
origins of the Constitution.
Under the Articles o f Confederation, our nation was a league
of disunite d State s , whose representatives met from time to time
to deal with a very limited range of common concerns in a system
that relied almost entirely on voluntary cooperation.

The

government under the Articles of Confederation was a dismal
failure.

We are in the "last stage of national humiliation,"

wrote Hamilton in Fe deralist No. 15.

Agreements broken, debts

unpaid, credit dried up, commerce stagnated, territory violated,
remonstrances scorned -- all of this was the disorder of the day.
Our national governme ntal non-structure was, according to
historian Herbert J. Storing, a "dark catalogue of public mis fortunes."
Perhaps the weakest of the weak government a l links under the
Articles of Confede ration

was th e court system.

Whe n the courts

functioned, they functioned in a piecemeal, haphazard way.
Sometimes they didn't function at all, as during "Shays' Rebe lllC'!1 "
in Mass achus e t t s in 1786, whe n disciples of Shays time and again
crowde d a round th e courthouse s and kept the courts from proce s s in g
d e bt cl a ims.

Thomas J effe rs o n, awa y in F rance on a mb assadori a l

as si g nme nt, was not pa rticularly worried about "Sha y s ' Reb e llion"
exc ept in so f ar as t h e p ri nc i pa l mani fes t a t io n s of di sco n te nt were
"th e at t e mpt s t o interfe r e with th e order ly process o f th e cou r t s ."
Th e d es i gn e r s of th e Consti tuti on would not forge t t his experi e nce
wi t h powerless courts .

-
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The Founders' Clear Choice of a
Strong National Government and Court
Washington, Adams, Jay, Hamilton, Madison and, later in
the process, Jefferson concluded that a much stronger governmental
structure was necessary to avoid the chaos, paralysis and disunion
of :- the day.

As the antidote to creeping anarchy, the Costitution

wa s born with strong powers in a truly national government.

An

integral part of national sovereignty established by the
Constitution was a national court.

The national judicial power

was "vested in one supreme court."

James Madison and Alexander

., "

"

Hamilton, the gui.i ng geniuses of Federalism, were clear on the
.

~

.

.

link between a stro~~~ independent Supreme Court and the
preservation of the Constitution against future inroads.
The Founding Fathers clearly realized that they would put
the basic survival of the Constitution in jeopardy if they
did not provide a strong and independent judicial power.

They

understood that, to quote Hamilton (in Federalist No. 22),
"Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define
their true meaning and operation."

And, fearing a legislature

whic;h, to quote Madison (in Federalist No. 48), was "everywhere
e xt ~nding

the sphere of it s activity and drawing all powe r into

its impetuous vortex," the Founders ensured an independe nt
" 'judiciary.
Not that th e Founde rs cre ated an "impe ri a l

judiciary."

Th e y provided for imp ea chme nt of judges for cause .

Th e y

sanctioned a constitutional ame ndment process for ch a n g ing th e
mea ning o f th e Cons titution.

(Of the 26 amendments t o th e

Constitution, four have ove rturned Supreme

Cou~t

opinions.)

-
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Yet, the Founders obviously intended that interferences
with court processes and rulings would be rare and difficult
to achieve.

Only in this way could they guarantee that the

federal courts could continue, as Justice Black later put it,
to "stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for
tho~~

who ...

are victims of prejudice and public excitement."
A History of Controversy About the Court

The historical record since ratification of the Constitution
proves that the Founders were quite savvy, in addition to being
brilliant .

. For, strong winds, to use Justice Black's metaphor,

have frequently blown around the federal courts, as they sought
to protect the individual rights and liberties embedded in the
constitutional compact.
Throughout his remarkable 34-year tenure as Chief Justice,
John Marshall was in a running battle with Presidents, Congress,
and State Governors as he asserted the judicial supremacy of the
Supreme Court.

President Jefferson so violently opposed Marsha ll

and:'his rampant Federalism that he even contemplated the
impeachment of the Chief Justice.
In the pre-Civil War years, ther e was intense and, at times,
vitriolic debate by Abolitionists in and out of Congress directed
at the Taney Court.
Early in the 20th century, progressives in Congress and
President Theodore Roosevelt castigated what they viewed to be
a reactionary Supreme Court.

Moves were initiated to restrict

the Supreme Court and to estab lish a method of recall of federal
judges.

-
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Getting closer to the present, we can recall the billboards
and bumper stickers in the '50s and '60s stating,

"Impeach

Earl Warren."
So, criticizing and disputing the Court and its decision~
is as old as the Republic itself and, presumably, "as American
as apple pie."

Fortunately, however, we have never let our

outrage at particular court actions lead us to place at risk
the fundamental authority and independence of our courts.
The Dangerous Nature of the
Present Attack on Court Authority
Undoubtedly, the recent rash of anti-court legislative
proposals draws some inspiration. from our custom of criticizing
the federal judiciary.

However, I want to begin my discussion

of the specific court-stripping proposals by observing how their
attack differs in important ways from the attack of their
, predecessors.
First, while previous attacks were primarily directed at
individual judges and the philosophical composition of the Court,
the present drive against the courts has been .launched on the
\

.

arcane, legally technlcal battlefield of court jurisdiction and
congressional remed ial power .

This means that whi .le previous

attacks , for th e most part, lacked any serious constitutional
cover, today' s court-stripping proposals seemingly come clothed
in the very language of the Constitution.

(As I will indicate ,

current proposals rest on Congress' power to regulat e federal
judicial power or to enforce several constitutional amendments
through "appropriate legislation.")

-
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The present attacks on the Court also differ from previous
ones in terms of the breadth of the damage they would do to our
constitutional system.
It is true that p r eviously considered attacks on particular
judges or courts, if they had been successful, would have
significantly harme d judicial independence and created a bad
precedent.

However, inherent in the present court-stripping

proposals is the theory that Congress can amend what the Supreme
Court has found to be the meaning of the Constitution merely
by passing a statute of one form or another.

Therefore, if

sanctioned and carried to their ultimate logic, the current
proposals would s ubj e ct an unlimited unive rse of constitutional
issue s to quick, legislative nullification.

Every

judge

and

every court would face case-by-case reversal, whenever a
transitory majority in the Congress could be mustered to pass
a court-stripping statute .
Let me now discus s th e three basic types of proposal s
by which some in Congre s s s e ek to amend the Constitution by
the back door.

As I mentioned, although the three types share

a common theory, they a r e constitutionally dangerous f or somewhat
di f fere nt r e asons .
Praye r in School s
Unti l Pr es i de nt Reaga n' s a nnounc e d suppo rt f o r
a

proposa l t o

a me nd t h e Constitution with re sp e ct to s chool

p ra y e r, th e f ro nt -running proposal to overturn Supre me
d ec i sio n s in this a r ea was th a t o f Se n a tor He lms .

Co u~t

The He lms b i l l ,

o ff ere d last Fall as an a mendment to the fe d e ral debt c e iling
r es olution, would have taken away the jurisdiction of the Suprerre Court

- 9 and other federal courts to hear cases relating to prayer
in schools.
Senator Helms' proposal did not purport, nor could he
have purported, to alter the jurisdiction of the state courts
to hear cases involving school prayer and the First Amendment;
state courts would be left as forums of last resort in school
prayer cases.

However, the proposal clearly banked on state

courts being less than zealous in discharging their duty to
: "protect and defend the Constitution" by enforcing the spirit
and letter of current Supreme Court , decrees.

As Senator Helms

made clear in 1981, he and his supporters expected adjudication
of school prayer cases in state, not federal court to "restore
to the American people the fundamental right of voluntary prayer
in the public schools," current law notwithstanding.
The constitutional infirmity of the Helms legislation seems
straightforward.

The proposal aims by mere statute to change

the Constitution's guarantees against establishment of religion,
as authoritatively interpreted by the courts, exercising a role
which dates from Marbury v. Madison.

This runs headlong into

the Framers' intent that the Constitution be changeable only
through the constitutional amendment process.

Specifically,

statutory amendment of the Constitution would run afo ul of
a caution sounded by Alexander Hamilton almost two centuries
~

a'g'd : that the Constitution should not be revised by "the
representatives of the people, whenever a momen tary inclination
happens to lay hold of a majority of the ir constituents,
incompatible with the provisions in the exis ,t ing Consti tution ... "

- 10 Despite all this, there is a swath of textual material which
seems on first inspection to provide constitutional cover for
proposals such as the Helms bill.

Article III, Section 2 of the

Constitution gives the Congress power to make "exceptions" and
"regulations" to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Proponents of the Helms approach, including Senator Helms himself,
have characterized removal of jurisdiction over certain constitutional
cases as an "exception" or "regulation" permitted by Article III.
Beyond the words of the Constitution, they point to jurisdictionlimiting statutes in non-constitutional settings and an 1869 case
in which the Supreme Court approved a restriction on its
jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases.
Whatever the surface appeal of these arguments, I believe,
with many legal scholars, that reliance on the

~xceptions

and

regulations clause for bills such as the Helms' school p r ayer
bill, is misplaced.
~ broader

.,'
~I

The Exceptions Clause must be read in its

constitutional context, and against the backdrop of the

• I

"

Constitutional Convention debates.
Viewed in that light, it is very doubtful that the Founders
intended congress' power over appellate jurisdiction to be a
lice nse to circumvent the constitutional independence of the
Supre me Court a nd th e s ol e mea ns which th e Constitution prescribes
for its amendme nt.

As r espect ed legal s chol a r He nry Hart put it:

"Why, wh a t mo nstro u s ill og ic!

To build u p a me r e powe r to r egul a t e

juri sd icti o n into a p ower t o aff e ct r ight s having nothing to d o
with juri s diction!

And [to s ay this] in contradicti o n to a ll t h e

other t e rms o f th e v e ry document which conf e rs th e powe r to
reg ul a t e juri sdiction!"

-
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Or as the present Attorney General of the United States
concluded in an extensively-documented letter to the Chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee:

"There is no doubt that

Congress possesses some power to regulat e the app e llate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court . . . . Congress may not, however, consistent
with the Constitution, make "exceptions" to Supreme Court
jurisdiction which would intrude upon the core functions of the .
Supreme Court as an independent and equal branch in our system
of separation of powers."

Abortion
The subject of abortion has prompted several jurisdictionlimiting bills along the lines of the Helms school prayer bill.
In addition, however, the effort to reverse Supreme Court cases
on the legality of abortion has led to a diff e rent proposal for
amending the Constitution by the back door.

I refer to Senator

Helms' bill, which, in t he version reported by a Subcommitt ee
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, would have Congress by statute
d e fin e th e word "pe r s on" in t h e Fourtee nth Ame ndment t hus :

"Th e

Congr e ss hereby r e cognize s th a t for the purpose of e nforcing th e
obliga tion of the States und e r the Fourtee nth Amendme nt not to
deprive p e rsons o f life without du e proces s of law, each human
li fe ex i s t s fro m c o nception ... "
Ma ny pe o p l e , myse lf in cl ude d, h a v e b ee n highly crit i ca l o f the
Supreme c o urt' s 197 3 a bortion d ec i s ions, a nd we s eek t o rec ti f y
t h ose deci sions by th e t r aditiona l cons t i tut i ona l a me n dme nt r oute .
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However, many abortion decision critics, again including me,
regard the Helms human life-defining approach as of very dubious
constitutionality.
Indeed, as with the school prayer bills, the Helms approach
to overturning abortion decisions by statute seems on its face
to subvert the fundamental attributes of the judicial power the
Founders ordained.

The power to define is the power to expound.

Under our Constitution, that power .is vested in the Supreme Court,
not the Congress.

To impute to Congress the power to reverse

abortion cases by the simple expedient of writing a statutory
definition of "person" would be to impute the right of Congress
to reverse through redefinition other portions of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well -- . including the terms "due process," "equal
protection," and some of the other bedrock rights, such as freedom
of the press and speech, which have been applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.

To permit a transitory,

political majority in Congress to rewrite the Constitution by
statute is to begin the destruction of the Constitution itself.
Yet, the situation is not quite as simple as it might seem.
The Helms abortion bill is similar to the school prayer bills
in another respect:

a constitutional provision and an expansively-

written Supreme Court decision blur what would otherwise be, to
my eyes , a clear picture of unconstitutionality.
Thus, proponents of the supposed power of Congress to
redefine by statute t he Fourteenth Amendment point to its
Section 5.

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states that,

"Th e Congress shall have power to enforce , by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this [Amendment]."

- 13 In Katzenbach v. M::)rgan, the Supreme Court construed Section 5 to
permit Congress to prohibit certain state voting laws as
discriminatory -- notwithstanding the Court's previous ruling
that the laws did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Although Section 5 and Morgan give this argument a semblance
.of constitutional validity, on closer analysis, the semblance is
more imaginary than real.

The Morgan Court sought to avoid any

general conclusion that Congress may displace the Court as
expounder of Fourteenth Amendment rights.
buttress that caution.

Subsequent cases

For example, Oregon v. Mitchell struck

down a legislative conclusion that the 18-year-old vote was
n e cessary to provide equal prot e ction under the Fourteenth
Amendment.

A majority of the Court joined separate opinions

assuming that the Court's, not Congress', interpretation of
Equal Protection should govern.
There is little in current case law or logic to justify
a congressional reversal of . basic Supreme Court enumerations
of the rights embe dded in the Fourteenth Amendment.
School Busing
The congr e ssional approach to school busing, as spearheaded
., by Senators He lms a nd Johnston, involves s ome of the que stions
1~~

,

already discus se d, but also brings a n ew and ver y di s turbing
dime n s ion to th e c urre nt court- s tripping effort s .

Th e He lms -

Johnston restrictions, as pass e d in the last Congr e ss, would
d e ny to th e fed e r a l courts the right to. impose a busing remedy
r e quiring travel b e yond fift e en minutes from a stude nt' s home .

-
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To the extent that the bill would restrict the ability of
the Supreme court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction over
school desegration cases involving busing remedies -- and there
is some dispute among those who have studied the amendment
about

wh~ther

it would do this -- it would have to be justified

as either a "regulation" of Supreme court jurisdiction or an
', ',

exercise of congress' remedial power to enforce constitutional
amendments.

For the reasons discussed previously, either

justification should be judged severely wanting.
However, as they would apply to the lower federal courts,
the Helms-Johnston restrictions seek justification in another,
quite different source.

Thus, because Congress has the discretion

under Article III to create the lower federal courts, some argue
that it therefore has the power to define or limit the remedies
that a lower federal court may impose.
It is true that efforts to restrict lower court actions stand
on a different footing from efforts to restrict the Supreme Court.
However, it is even more true that hobbling the judiciary by
denying it the remedy necessary to vindicate a constitutional
right may well be the same as nullifying the constitutional right
itself.

In cons titutional terms, denial of adequate remedial

power would be invalid as an impermissible congr essional
with the essentials of the independent judicial function.

interf~renc E

Or, it

could we ll b e a violation of constitutional provisions outside of th E
Article III power (such as, due process), which constrain
legislative action.

- 15 In the very practical terms of the Helms-Johnston amendment
~s

it passed the Senate, Congress, by statute, is saying to an

~ ggrieved
~n

minori t y student that there is a 15-minute "shot clock"

your Equal Protection right.

~ rovide
\~oulre
.

The lower federal courts can

you a reme dy f or up to 15 minutes; beyond that, "Sorry,
on your own. "

Conclusion
Hear these moving words from a legislative report:
"Manifestly, if we may force the hand of the Court to secure
~ur

interpretation of the Constitution, then some succe e ding

~ongress

may repeat the process to secure another and a different

~nterpretation
~s

and one which may not sound so pleasant in our ears

that for which we now contend.
"It is e s sential to the continuance of our constitutional

,
Ciemocracy that th e judiciary be completely indep e ndent of both
t h e e xecutive and leg i slative branches of th e Government, and
we a s sert that inde pendent cour ts are the last safeguard of the
citizen, where h i s rights come in conflict with th e power of
governmental agencies."
Thu s spok e t h e Se n a t e Jud ic i ary Committe e in 1937 when
liberal Fr anklin Roo sev e l t s ought to r e -writ e cons e rva tive
Su p r e me Cou r t op i ni o n s by th e ing e niou s stra t egem of "pa cking"
t h e Court with app ointees of his own choos ing .

Today, 46 yea r s

l a t e r, d is s a ti s f ie d cons erv a tive s want to re -w r ite l i b era l
Sup r e me Court op i ni o n s by e qually ing e nious strategems o f
re -wri ti ng the Co ns ti t ution b y s t a tut e or by procedur a l a rt ifi c e .
In s hort, th e y want to a me nd the Constitution by th e back d o or.

- 16 The 1937 words of the Senate Judiciary Committee are

"

.1 •

just as applicable today.

What can be manipulated by today's

political majority can be just as easily manipulated by
tomorrow's -- and to other ends.
In a very real sense, the choice

befor~

the Congress and

the country is whether we want a Constitution according to
Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall, or a Constitution according
to Jesse Helms.

To me, the choice is abundantly clear.

